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Organizational Resistance as a Vector of Deterritorialization: the case of Wik-
iLeaks and Secrecy Havens  
 
‘We do not lack communication. On the contrary we have too much of it. We lack resistance 
to the present.’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 108).   
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relations of power and resistance manifest by the Wik-
iLeaks network. The primary research question of this inquiry is, ‘what power rela-
tions and possibilities for resistance are presented by WikiLeaks as a novel form of 
network organization?’ The paper shows that WikiLeaks has been able to exert influ-
ence from the periphery of existing networks by exploiting vectors of ‘deterritorializa-
tion’ to destabilize existing power relations. The paper contributes to the literature on 
the network organization by developing an account of resistance to State and corpo-
rate power in terms of an ‘absolute deterritorialization.’ This idea has important im-
plications for the tactics of resistance in network organizations, where vectors of de-






This paper investigates the power relations and tactics of resistance of the WikiLeaks 
network in terms of its processes of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’. The 
WikiLeaks network has been one of the most influential and controversial network 
organizations of the past decade
i
. The tactics of resistance of WikiLeaks have focused 
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on its inversion of existing hegemonic systems of surveillance, where this network 
has attacked the ‘secrecy havens’ of the powerful and endeavoured to create its own 
anti-secrecy havens. This analysis demands that we move beyond the boundaries of 
the workplace which has characterized much of the existing scholarship on organiza-
tional resistance (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Bain and Taylor, 2000; Ball and Wil-
son, 2000; Contu, 2008; Courpasson et al., 2012; Fleming and Spicer, 2003; Jermier, 
et al, 1994; Knights and McCabe 2000, 2003), and situate tactics of resistance within 
a broader context of socio-political processes of deterritorialization in order to explain 
how WikiLeaks has destabilized existing relations of power.  
 
The profound creativity of network forms of organization has already been the subject 
of much research within organization studies and the sociology of organization (Bor-
gatti and Foster, 2003; Brass, et al. 2004; Castells, 1996, 1997, 2012; Demil and 
Lecocq, 2006; Miles and Snow, 1992; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Podolny and 
Page, 1998; Terranova, 2004; Wallemacq, 1998). Brass et al. (2004) have observed 
that a crucial aspect of the dynamics of network organizations is that they may be 
transformed from ‘above’ by their environments as well as from ‘below’ by their con-
stituent elements. Existing studies of network organizations have revealed their eco-
nomic potential in terms of their greater adaptability and creativity (Brass et al., 2004; 
Castells, 1996; Miles and Snow, 1992; Podolny and Page, 1998), and in terms of their 
development of governance systems that are designed to exploit network externalities 
(Demil and Lecocq, 2006; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Von Hippel, 2001). New 
forms of organizational network have been pioneered in the open source community 
which have led to radical changes in organizational governance and the way that 
boundaries are negotiated and collaborations formed by organizations (Demil and 
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Lecocq, 2006; O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Von 
Hippel, 2001; Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003). As well as being understood as a 
fertile site of innovation and productivity, the network organization has also been rec-
ognized as the site of social and political conflict (Castells, 1997, 2012; Lash, 2002; 
Tarrow, 2011, Terranova, 2004). 
 
Existing research within organization studies on organizational networks has tended 
to focus on areas characterized by a convergence of interests (e.g. Brass et al., 2004; 
Demil and Lecocq, 2006; O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007; O’Mahony and Bechky, 
2008; Von Hippel, 2001; Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003). Radical conflict within 
networks has been the subject of study within other social sciences (e.g. Castells 
1996, 1997, 2012, 2013; Lash, 2002; Tarrow, 2011; Terranova, 2004), but has yet to 
receive sufficient attention within the field of organization studies. Ball’s (2005: 92) 
incisive analysis of power and resistance in contemporary organizations has high-
lighted the emergence of networks of ‘surveillance rhizomes’, where the ‘central 
problematic is how to observe and analyse resistance in the absence of the large-scale 
formal protest and collective antagonism witnessed in the mid-20th century.’ More 
recent events such as the Arab Spring of 2011 and the Occupy Movement have led 
Manuel Castells (2012) to argue that network organizations have played a crucial role 
in recent democratic struggles and the creation of ‘spaces of autonomy’ that lie be-
yond the reach of oppressive State control, where WikiLeaks has itself emerged as 
one such network. The present paper analyzes the tactics of resistance developed by 
the WikiLeaks network that invert existing hegemonic systems of surveillance by 
supporting privacy for the weak and transparency of the powerful.  
 
  - 4 - 
This paper investigates the changing power relations and possibilities of resistance of 
network organizations by drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988, 1994) concep-
tion of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’. The paper shows that WikiLeaks 
exploits vectors of deterritorialization to destabilize existing power relations and has 
thus been able to exert influence from the periphery of existing networks. This idea 
has important implications for the tactics of resistance in network organizations, 
where these tactics entail the deterritorialization of WikiLeaks’ own activities and the 
reterritorialization of the activities of corporations. The main research question driv-
ing this inquiry is, ‘what power relations and possibilities for resistance are presented 
by WikiLeaks as a novel form of network organization?’ The paper makes three con-
tributions to the understanding of power in network organizations: i) it shows how 
power can be exercised by organizations on the periphery of existing networks rather 
than as a function of central nodes, ii) it explains the destabilization of existing power 
relations in terms of the concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, iii) 
and it explains the effectiveness of tactics of resistance of networks to the extent that 
they approach an ‘absolute deterritorialization’. 
 
The paper builds a case study of WikiLeaks based upon a diversity of sources in the 
public domain. These sources include first hand accounts of WikiLeaks that have 
been published by individual insiders who have worked for this organization and from 
the extensive data available on the website itself (Assange, 2011; Assange et al., 
2012; Beckett and Ball, 2012; Domscheit-Berg and Klopp, 2011; WikiLeaks.org). In 
addition to these first hand accounts data has also been taken from leaked reports on 
WikiLeaks by the European Commission (2012) and from supporting secondary 
commentary in the media and academic sources (Amnesty International, 2011; 
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Brevini et al., 2013; Fuchs, 2011; Greenberg, 2012; Hood 2012; Leigh and Harding, 
2011; Roberts, 2012; Sifry, 2011). The analysis of data is based on Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) methodological principle of ‘enfolding literature’ by means of which existing 
conceptual developments are refined with reference to new empirical case studies. 
This approach to conceptual development is only partially inductive in its use of em-
pirical material, drawing upon and refining existing philosophical concepts for the 
purposes of organizational analysis. 
 
This paper begins with a review of the literature on network organizations followed 
by an analysis structured around five major vectors of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reter-
ritorialization’ of the WikiLeaks network: i) WikiLeaks as a boundary spanning ‘dis-
organization’, ii) its distinctive role as the first ‘Stateless’ news organization, iii) its 
revelation of ‘secrecy havens’ that have been created to avoid democratic oversight 
and regulation, iv) the emergence of a system of extra-judicial control formed by a 
hybrid of State agencies and corporations in an attempt to undermine the activities of 
WikiLeaks, and v) attempts that have been made to ‘reterritorialize’ WikiLeaks by 
organizations that wish to attack it.  
 
Networks and Power 
 
The literature on network organizations contrasts the emergence of network forms of 
organization as flexible, adaptable, horizontal structures of authority with previous 
highly structured bureaucratic forms (Brass, 2004; Castells, 1996, 1997, 2013; Demil 
and Lecocq, 2006; Miles and Snow, 1992; Podolny and Page, 1998). This picture of 
open horizontal networks is complicated by studies of organizations that have shown 
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how networks have also been used to intensify power relations through new forms of 
surveillance (Ball, 2005; Bain and Taylor, 2000; Burrell, 1988; Clegg, and Baumeier, 
2010; Lyon, 1994; Munro, 2000). 
 
In their review of the mainstream literature on the network organization Brass et al. 
(2004: 798) concluded that ‘actors in central network positions {italics inserted} have 
greater access to, and potential control over, relevant resources, such as information in 
a communication network.’ Even in this rather functionalist perspective issues of 
power and control remain a pervasive feature of the network organization. From a 
more critical perspective Munro (2000) and Ball (2005) have described how networks 
of surveillance are beginning to supplement and supplant traditional panoptic forms of 
organizational control. Ball (2005) has demonstrated the emergence of networks of 
free-floating control that deploy technologies increasingly detached from particular 
sites of confinement which she terms ‘surveillance rhizomes’. Others have described 
an intensification of social surveillance in terms the ‘synopticon’ which entails a re-
versal of hierarchical panoptic relations where communications networks are enabling 
the many to watch the few (Bauman, 2000; Clegg and Baumier, 2010; Mathiesen, 
1997). Despite the relatively participative and democratic façade of these synoptic 
networks Mathiesen (1997: 225) notes that, ‘even in the most interactive media, the 
basic conditions are increasingly … set from above rather than from below… though 
they may still contain the illusion of two parties on an equal footing.’ This literature 
has done well in describing the ongoing transformation of organizational power rela-
tions in terms of the intensification of networks of surveillance, but less attention has 
been paid to the forms of resistance that are arising in opposition to these new net-
works.   
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In contrast to existing research that has tended to focus upon the intensification of 
surveillance (Ball, 2005; Bain and Taylor, 2000; Clegg, and Baumeier, 2010; Lyon, 
1994; Munro, 2000) and instances of micropolitical resistance against corporate con-
trol (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Bain and Taylor, 2000; Ball and Wilson, 2000; 
Contu, 2008; Courpasson et al., 2012; Fleming and Spicer, 2003; Jermier, et al, 1994; 
Knights and McCabe 2000, 2003), the present paper focuses upon ‘lines of flight’ be-
yond these centres of power. An emerging literature has begun to look outside the 
boundaries of the workplace for sources of resistance that are developing on the pe-
riphery of centres of power, particularly in the formation of counter-hegemonic net-
works by social movement organizations (Böhm, et al, 2008; Davis et al, 2005; Kra-
emer, et al., 2013; Spicer and Böhm, 2007; Spicer and Van Bommel, 2011). The pre-
sent paper extends this literature by showing how the new tactics of resistance devel-
oped by WikiLeaks are attempting to build counter-hegemonic systems of surveil-
lance to reveal and oppose the ‘secrecy havens’ of corporate power. 
 
Manuel Castells (1996, 1997, 2012, 2013) is perhaps the preeminent social theorist of  
power and resistance in the network society today. In his early commentary on the 
rise of network organizations he claimed that this was directly related to a decline of 
traditional hierarchical forms of power where power ‘is no longer concentrated in in-
stitutions (the state), organizations (capitalist firms), or symbolic controllers (corpo-
rate media, churches)’ (Castells, 1997: 359). Castells has since revised this conception 
of power, and in his recent work he has developed a technocratic analogy between 
power and computer programming where power networks are described as being 
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composed of ‘programmers’ and ‘switchers’ (Castells, 2012, 2013). He explains this 
distinction in the following terms: 
 
 “…who holds power in the network society? The programmers with the capaci-
ty to programme each one of the main networks on which people’s lives depend 
(government, parliament, the military and security establishment, finance, me-
dia, science and technology institutions, etc.) And the switchers who operate the 
connections between different networks (media moguls introduced in the politi-
cal class, financial elites bankrolling political elites…)” (Castells, 2012: 8-9).  
 
In this revised definition, Castells argues that corporations and the State still hold sig-
nificant power as central nodes in global networks of power in their new role as ‘pro-
grammers’ and ‘switchers’. Following this logic he explains that resistance to power 
occurs when people are ‘able to invent new programmes for their lives’ (Castells, 
2012: 9). However, this technocratic analogy between power and computer program-
ming is in danger of reducing the complex political conflicts that underpin network 
organizations to the relatively uncontentious matter of writing new code. 
 
The concept of ‘deterritorialization’ is particularly suitable for analyzing the power 
relations of the network organization, where ‘power centers are defined much more 
by what escapes them or by their impotence than by their zone of power’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1988: 217). Rather than seeing organizations as structures, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1986, 1988) argue that they are better understood in terms of the ‘lines of 
flight’ and the processes of ‘deterritorialization’ by means of which they are trans-
formed (see also Brighenti, 2010; Elden, 2005; Linstead and Thanem, 2007). Paul 
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Patton (2012: 208) provides a concise but broad definition of deterritorialization as 
the ‘movement or process by which something escapes or departs from a given terri-
tory, where a territory can be a system of any kind: conceptual, linguistic, social, or 
affective’ (see also Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 508)ii. Deleuze and Guattari (1988, 
1994) primarily employ the term in their description of social formations such as no-
madism, capitalism and the State (also see Elden, 2005). They distinguish between 
two general forms of deterritorialization, i) ‘relative deterritorializations’, which are 
subsequently reterritorialized in order to be exploited by power - for instance during 
the Industrial Revolution peasant labour was ‘freed’ from working on the land only to 
be reterritorialized as wage labour within the factory - and ii) ‘absolute deterritoriali-
zations’ which outpace attempts to recapture them, such as forms of nomadism. They 
argue that resistance to post-industrial capitalism requires an ‘absolute deterritoriali-
zation’ that entails the creation of new forms of ‘resistance to the present’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994: 108). 
 
Existing research within the field of management and organization studies has already 
proposed that Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of the ‘rhizome’ and the ‘nomadic war 
machine’ can be used to understand transformation and creativity in modern organiza-
tions and organizational networks (Ball, 2005; Blaug, 1999; Chia 1999; Clegg et al., 
2005; Linstead and Thanem, 2007; Sorensen 2005; Thanem, 2011). Historically, pro-
cesses of deterritorialization have been crucial in the development of capitalism itself. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988, 1994) show how the power of capitalism has been inten-
sified through the circulation of deterritorialized flows of wealth and how State power 
has also been intensified through military-technological forms of deterritorialization 
(e.g. naval and air power). The emergence of network organizations is a key part of 
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this historical dynamic where, ‘Organizational networks can be understood as vectors 
of deterritorialization that traverse national and geographic borders and are then reter-
ritorialized within organizations through processes of ownership and access rights, 
such as branding and the imposition of intellectual property rights.’ (Marachel et al., 
2013: 200). The present study builds on these insights, with a focus on the relations of 
power and resistance in the ongoing mutation of the network organization. In the case 
of WikiLeaks, this paper shows that this network’s ability to mobilize political and 
organizational resistance is characterized by the specific vectors of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization that have been constitutive of the network’s development.  
 
In order to provide an adequate account of the contextual forces that underpin the de-
velopment of WikiLeaks it is necessary to investigate the “cross level pressures” 
(Brass, et al., 2004) that have characterized its emergence. Difficulties arise with con-
fining the analysis of network organizations to a single level because “levels of analy-
sis… do not necessarily correspond in a simple way to the type of entities being stud-
ied” (Borgatti and Foster, 2003: 1001). Therefore, the present study undertakes a 
cross level analysis of WikiLeaks which encompasses the actions of isolated whistle-
blowers, the inter-organizational alliances formed with WikiLeaks, hacker groups, 
media corporations and social movement organizations, and a macro-level analysis of 
the broader political forces at work related to secrecy havens and the alliance between 
big business and the national security establishment. The analysis necessarily crosses 
between these different levels in its identification of the diverse vectors of ‘deterrito-
rialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’ of the WikiLeaks network. We now turn to an 
analysis of the specific vectors of deterritorialization that have been exploited by the 
WikiLeaks network.   
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WikiLeaks as a Boundary-Spanning ‘Disorganization’  
 
One of the most puzzling characteristics of WikiLeaks is the difficulty in categorizing 
it in terms of traditional organizational forms, where it has been variously called a 
hacker organization, a whistleblowing organization, a publisher of the last resort, and 
a human rights organization (Beckett and Ball, 2012; Brevini et al., 2013; Leigh and 
Harding, 2011). It has emerged in collaboration with a variety of different organiza-
tions including hacker groups (e.g. the Chaos Computer Club, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation), media organizations (e.g. The Guardian, The New York Times, Der 
Spiegel, El Pais), and social movement organizations (e.g. Amnesty International) in 
order to disseminate its message. To some extent WikiLeaks might be understood as a 
manifestation of what Scott Lash (2002) has termed a ‘disorganization’. According to 
Lash the evolution of the network society has witnessed a proliferation of disorgani-
zations. He argued that, ‘Disorganizations are less local, less fixed, more often global-
ly dispersed, constantly changing and literally on the move than are normal organiza-
tions.’ (Lash, 2002: 40). Following Deleuze and Guattari, he described disorganiza-
tions as ‘rhizomes’ that spread across organizational boundaries. WikiLeaks exists on 
the boundaries of many other organizations and as such acts as a distinctive type of 
‘boundary organization’ (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008), which has rapidly changed 
its form as it has come into contact with and developed new alliances with these or-
ganizations. 
 
The rapid mutation of WikiLeaks can be described in terms of three distinctive stages 
of development (Sifry, 2011). In the first stage of its development WikiLeaks was a 
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wikipage for raw information from leakers and whistleblowers, which could be used 
as a valuable resource by social activists and citizen journalists. The second stage of 
development was like the first with the addition of information edited and processed 
by members of the WikiLeaks network themselves, which emerged in an effort to en-
courage greater public attention towards the information posted on the site. Finally, 
the third stage of the organization’s development witnessed the formation of a strong-
er alliance with the media to include information edited by select members of the tra-
ditional news media. At this stage WikiLeaks began to characterize itself less as a 
whistleblower platform and more in journalistic terms as a ‘publisher of the last re-
sort’ (Assange, 2011). WikiLeaks has mutated rapidly as it has come into contact and 
developed alliances with a variety of outside organizations and has proven to be a 
highly unstable organizational form characterized by numerous vectors of deterritori-
alization as we shall see in the ensuing analysis.  
 
The Rise of the First Stateless News Organization 
 
WikiLeaks has endeavored to protect itself from corporate and State retaliation by 
identifying and exploiting favourable national laws in various countries in order to 
protect its sources, its content and the circulation of the leaked documents that it re-
ceives. It exploits the relatively deterritorialized nature of cyberspace in order to pro-
tect the identity of its sources. WikiLeaks has been ‘mirrored’ on hundreds of Internet 
sites in an effort to circumvent censorship by any particular nation state (The New 
York Times, 5.12.2010). It locates its servers in those countries that have the most 
favourable and open censorship laws (Assange, 2011; Domscheit-Berg and Klopp, 
2011). In some respects this development reflects the tactics of the organizations that 
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it is opposing, rendering itself untouchable by moving to locations where more fa-
vourable laws apply. WikiLeaks is part of a deterritorialized flow of information, and 
in particular information that corporations and States have taken steps to ensure is 
kept secret. As corporations have endeavoured to make their activities invisible by 
locating them in poor, third world countries (Bakan, 2004), WikiLeaks has made their 
activities visible again in cyberspace. The nature of WikiLeaks was conceived in de-
territorialized terms as part of a global movement for the free flow of information, as 
we can see from accounts given by its founding members:  
 
“A home is not an easy thing to contemplate when it comes to WikiLeaks: we 
have active servers operating at secret locations all over the world; we have a 
network of staff and contacts, most of them wishing to remain nameless, who are 
never found in the same place at the same time. WikiLeaks was different from any 
other kind of media organization: we were never going to have a reception desk or 
a coffee machine…” (Assange, 2011: 173) 
 
“Our servers were located in countries with the most favorable laws {italics in-
serted} and the best protection of sources.” (Domscheit-Berg and Klopp, 2011: 
125). 
 
“WikiLeaks’ fundamental exceptionalism is that it is outside of a specific geo-
graphical legal framework. This gives it a large degree of immunity from normal 
legal sanctions on the media.” (Beckett and Ball, 2012: 94). 
 
  - 14 - 
“… maybe we are a post-state organization {italics inserted} because of the lack 
of geographic control. I don’t want to take this analogy too far, because I am un-
der house arrest.” (Assange et al., 2012: 128) 
 
The deterritorialization of WikiLeaks is clearly apparent in its ‘multi-jurisdictional’ 
design where it has been explicitly ‘structured in such a way to make use of those 
laws we have in this world that were created in times of openness and a vision of 
transparency, freedom of speech and protection of the press. It therefore is a project 
homed in all those countries of the world that offer protection to the revelatory work it 
is doing’ (WikiLeaks.org/wiki/Draft:FAQ1). These tactics can be described as a ‘vec-
tor of deterritorialization’ where the earth ‘ceases to be land, tending to become simp-
ly ground… or support’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 381-382). 
 
Giorgio Agamben (1995: 77) has observed that rendering people Stateless can be a 
biopolitical mechanism of power for dehumanizing and reducing them to ‘bare life’. 
In the present case the ‘Stateless’ condition of WikiLeaks has played a somewhat am-
bivalent role in the evolution of the network. On the one hand, its Stateless condition 
has been exploited to protect WikiLeaks from State censorship, but on the other hand 
Assange has asked for protection and political asylum from those States that are sym-
pathetic to his cause. Assange himself refers to the work of the Soviet dissident Alex-
ander Solzhenitsyn in his discussion of protest as a form of Stateless activity. He dis-
cusses an incident in the novel The First Circle where Solzhenitsyn describes a per-
son’s induction into the prison system: “When filling in a form and asked for his na-
tionality he puts not ‘Russian,’ but ‘Prisoner’. His mind is set upon inventions and he 
feels he is nothing if not stateless.’ (Assange, 2011: 92). Assange has been made 
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acutely aware of his relatively deterritorialized status as a political asylum seeker 
trapped in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. Whilst he is not formally a prisoner in 
the embassy, Assange would be arrested by the police the moment that he set foot 
outside of this building and he is thus in the paradoxical situation that he must volun-
tarily confine himself to this building in order to maintain his freedom
iii
. The identity 
of prisoner transcends that of national identity in what might be termed as a process of 
deterritorialization. Indeed, the vectors of deterritorialization described by Deleuze 
and Guattari (1986) are as much concerned with identity as they are concerned with 
geographical territory.  
 
These geographical arrangements make clear that it would be a mistake to conflate the 
process of deterriorialization with dematerialization (Cohen, 2007; Elden, 2006; 
Hayles, 1999). In this respect Julie Cohen’s (2007: 225) commentary on the law that 
governs cyberspace has observed that, ‘Debates about information access and control 
in cyberspace have consequences that bleed over into real space…’ She argues that 
cyberspace is not a disembodied medium of communication and is better understood 
as a nexus of social practice grounded in real world activities, technologies, and laws. 
The material aspects of the WikiLeaks case are all too apparent in the power struggles 
over the relative visibility and invisibility of corporations and whistleblowers, in the 
concerns for the physical locations of communications terminals and infrastructure, 
and in the focus on Julian Assange’s body as a point of reterritorialization and con-
finement. The diverse vectors of reterritorialization that surround the WikiLeaks net-
work are discussed in greater detail below.  
 
The Reterritorialization of Secrecy Havens  
  - 16 - 
 
In Julian Assange’s (2011) personal account of the WikiLeaks project he describes its 
aim as revealing the ‘secrecy havens’ of the powerful that allow their actions to go 
unnoticed. He picked out Guantanamo Bay and the Cayman Islands as two particular 
exemplars of such havens, but provides numerous detailed examples of the wider 
networks that facilitate the operation of such havens that have been revealed by the 
WikiLeaks network. For instance, one of the earliest leaks revealed by WikiLeaks 
concerned the embezzlement of over  £1bn of Kenyan State funds by former president 
Moi. The leaks also revealed the complicity of international banks including Barclays 
Bank and HSBC in the use of tax havens to hide these embezzled funds. Assange 
(2011: 152) highlights the importance of revealing these ‘secrecy havens’ to the Wik-
iLeaks network explaining that, “This is exactly the kind of corruption WikiLeaks 
was set up to reveal. And upending tax havens would be a future hobby of ours.” As 
wealthy corporations and powerful States have endeavored to make their activities 
invisible by means of legal injunctions and the use of secrecy havens, WikiLeaks has 
found a way around this by itself becoming a Stateless organization in cyberspace. 
 
One of WikiLeaks’ earliest leaks concerned the operations of the Trafigura corpora-
tion, which provides a compelling example of the potential of WikiLeaks as a ‘vector 
of deterritorialization’. In 2009 The Guardian newspaper and BBC Newsnight at-
tempted to publish stories about the Minton Report on Trafigura, which showed how 
this corporation had illegally dumped tonnes of toxic waste off the Ivory Coast, poi-
soning around 30,000 of the nearby inhabitants (Greenpeace, 2010; The Guardian, 
17.10.2009). Trafigura succeeded in obtaining a legal injunction against the press 
both in reporting this incident in the media and in reporting the existence of the in-
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junction itself (known as a ‘super injunction’). However, the details of the injunction 
were leaked to the WikiLeaks website, and not long after the leak had spread across 
the Internet the High Court lifted its injunction against press coverage of the incident. 
Of particular note here is that the ‘super injunction’ taken out by Trafigura was not 
only aimed at the press but also at the British government, where the company had 
successfully prevented a discussion of its overseas activities in the British parliament. 
Here we have an attempt by a large corporation to obscure its harmful activities from 
scrutiny by means of geographical distance and by legal measures, where these 
measures were then circumvented by a leak of the relevant information to the Wik-
iLeaks network.  
 
WikiLeaks has not only revealed secrecy havens but has also been involved in the es-
tablishment of ‘anti-secrecy havens’ (Assange, 2011: 174). Apart from the WikiLeaks 
project itself, the most successful attempt to create such a haven in practice has arisen 
from their close involvement with the ‘Iceland Modern Media Initiative’. The IMMI 
initiative developed from the social upheavals of the Icelandic banking collapse and 
the political and financial corruption that were exposed in large part by the WikiLeaks 
network. This proposal has transformed the territory of Iceland into an anti-secrecy 
haven that offers strong legal protections for freedom of expression, as well as specif-
ic legal protections for journalists, publishers, whistleblowers and Internet intermedi-
aries (see https://immi.org/ for an extended commentary on the nature of this haven 
passed by the Icelandic Parliament in June 2010). Hintz (2013) has described the legal 
framework of this new anti-secrecy haven as ‘policy hacking’, where WikiLeaks has 
provided advice to the Icelandic parliament on legislation from a host of countries that 
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serve as useful models for the creation of a haven for media organizations and activ-
ists.  
 
In the so called ‘information society’ the role of secrecy has taken on a new level of 
significance not only concerning matters of security (both State and corporate) but 
also concerning the protection of individual privacy, and in supporting intellectual 
property rights laws. Secrecy is a crucial concept for the WikiLeaks network where 
on the one hand the secrets of powerful social institutions, such as corporations and 
the State, are made more open and transparent, and on the other hand a level of secre-
cy is given to the weak, in particular to the whistleblowers who may otherwise be vic-
timized by the institutions whose secrets they have revealed (Brevini et al., 2013). In 
important respects WikiLeaks functions as a double of the State, and even describes 
itself as being ‘the first intelligence agency of the people’ 
(http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Draft:FAQ1).  
 
The control of secrecy is deemed to be such an important factor of State security that 
encryption technology is classified under US law as being a ‘dual use technology’ – a 
tool that can also be used as a weapon where the export of encryption software is reg-
ulated as a munition. WikiLeaks explicitly allies itself with the ‘cypherpunk’ hacker 
movement which holds that secrecy and privacy ought not to be the privilege of the 
powerful (Assange et al., 2012; Hughes, 1993). The cypherpunks have developed 
many tools in order to democratize and promulgate privacy by ‘building anonymous 
systems… defending our privacy with cryptography, with anonymous mail forward-
ing systems, with digital signatures, and with electronic money.’ (Hughes, 1993: 2). 
The secret allows a vector of movement that would otherwise not be possible for such 
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groups. The practice of secrecy is a key element of what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) 
have called the ‘nomadic war machine’. They note that secrecy is a powerful weapon 
for social transformation used by elite social groups to maintain their power base as 
well as by underground insurgent movements in efforts to fundamentally transform 
the prevailing social order. The revelation of State secrets has clearly been the most 
contentious aspect of WikiLeaks’ operations, which has led to it being denounced as 
an insurgent operation and a terrorist organization (Domscheit-Berg and Klopp, 2011; 
Greenwald, 2014; The Washington Post, 2010).  
 
Strictly speaking the creation of an anti-secrecy haven entails both vectors of deterri-
torialization and reterritorialization, where deterritorialized information flows are first 
protected and circulated by the haven, and may then be subsequently reterritorialized 
by the State. A key objective of an anti-secrecy haven is to make the activities of cor-
porations more transparent in order to subject them to increased oversight and there-
fore to ‘temper the madness’ of capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 98). Despite 
its deterritorializing manoeuvres within cyberspace, WikiLeaks’ finances have 
emerged as a key tactical vulnerability, which I shall now examine in greater detail.  
 
The Reterritorialization of WikiLeaks by ‘Extra-Judicial’ Controls 
 
Even during the early days of WikiLeaks, measures were being taken by the US Army 
Intelligence Centre to disrupt its operations, recommending that WikiLeaks be sup-
plied with misinformation in an attempt to discredit it and to initiate legal proceedings 
against the organization and its leakers in order to: ‘damage and destroy this center of 
gravity and deter others from using Wikileaks.org to make such information public.’ 
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(Hovarth quoted in McCurdy, 2013: 132). Hood (2012) has observed that the opera-
tions of WikiLeaks have prompted a massive legal response, including over 100 
threatened law suits and secret grand jury proceedings taken against Assange in the 
USA (Centre for Constitutional Rights, 2012). 
 
Many of the organizations that facilitated its financial transactions have been subject 
to lobbying and influence from the political establishment in the United States 
(Benkler, 2011; Brevini et al., 2013). Political, financial and business institutions in 
the US have built an informal alliance in their campaign to destroy WikiLeaks, de-
priving it of its financial support. Harvard Law professor Yochai Benkler (2011) has 
described this as a fundamentally new approach to government, which subverts many 
of the legal protections provided by the First Amendment. Benkler (2011) notes that 
WikiLeaks has not been accused or convicted of any crime, and that in the US its ac-
tivities are protected as a form of freedom of expression under the First Amendment. 
His analysis of the legal status of the organization highlights an extremely worrying 
development in the way that government and big business have collaborated in perse-
cuting WikiLeaks that circumvents its First Amendment rights. The US political es-
tablishment has managed to persuade major corporations including Amazon, Paypal, 
Visa, MasterCard and Bank of America, to blacklist WikiLeaks as a customer and 
thus disrupt both its online presence and its financing. This was most notable from the 
revelation that Joe Lieberman, chairman of the Senate’s Homeland Security Commit-
tee, had contacted Amazon.com to stop hosting the WikiLeaks website on its own 
servers and MasterCard in an effort to persuade them to stop providing the website 
with financial services (Brevini et al., 2013; European Commission, 2012).  
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The emergence of a system of extra judicial governance is not simply a concern in the 
United States but has also been identified by an investigation undertaken by the Euro-
pean Commission (2012) into the prosecution of WikiLeaks by corporations, where it 
has uncovered evidence that corporate networks are acting as a ‘para-regulator’ oper-
ating outside the reach of European governments. Therefore, we can see that whilst 
WikiLeaks has used cyberspace to work around national censorship and data protec-
tion laws, it has been far more difficult to work around a financial system in which 
US corporations act as central nodes within the network and are obligatory points of 
passage for the sites’ finances. 
 
The other key vulnerability of WikiLeaks is the body of Julian Assange himself. One 
consequence of Assange’s identification of himself with the organization is that he 
has presented himself as an easy target, especially given the relative sophistication of 
technical aspects of the WikiLeaks project. The WikiLeaks project has become re-
territorialized around the body of its founder. The almost complete identification of 
WikiLeaks with Assange has led some commentators to describe WikiLeaks as a 
‘Single Person Organization’ or ‘Unique Personality Organization’ (Lovink, 2010: 3). 
Assange himself has been quoted as claiming that, “I am the heart of soul of this or-
ganization, its founder, philosopher, spokesperson, original coder, organizer, financi-
er, and all the rest” (quoted Beckett and Ball, 2012: 90). Since WikiLeaks began re-
leasing whistleblower leaks into cyberspace Assange has been accused of being a liar, 
a spy, a terrorist, and a rapist.  
 
The status of WikiLeaks as an outlet for the truth about the activities of governments 
and big business has certainly been tarnished by these accusations. Writing for the US 
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news outlet CNN, Micah Sifry has argued that Assange ought to have stepped aside 
from WikiLeaks for the good of the organization, when his legal troubles first 
emerged (CNN, 2012). There is little doubt that these accusations have had the effect 
of undermining the reputation of WikiLeaks and the perception of the information 
that it has released (Brevini et al., 2013). Despite these accusations there is still a sur-
prisingly high level of public support for the project, given the allegations made 
against it and its members, although the level of support varies greatly from country 
to country. For instance public opinion in Australia and the UK has been broadly in 
favour of the project (Lester, 2011; Martinez, 2010). In contrast, public opinion in 
Germany and the USA has been significantly more hostile to WikiLeaks (Pew Re-
search Center for the People & the Press, 2010; Marxist Institute for Public Opinion, 
2010).  
 
We can therefore see that WikiLeaks displays a distinctive vector of deterritorializa-
tion in the continuing evolution of the network organization. The deterritorializing 
flows of information that have been facilitated by WikiLeaks have been challenged by 
a reterritorialization of conflicts around its financial infrastructure and the emergence 
of a hybrid system of ‘extra-judicial’ governance, even in the face of pre-existing le-
gal guards against such alliances between the corporate elites and the State. These 
conflicts will now be analyzed in greater detail by drawing on the concept of infor-
mation warfare.  
 
WikiLeaks and Information War 
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A wide variety of commentators have described the WikiLeaks network in the terms 
of information warfare (Beckett and Ball, 2012; Leigh and Harding, 2011; Lovink, 
2010; Sifry, 211). This may be considered unsurprising given that Julian Assange, the 
founder of WikiLeaks, comes from a background in hacking and was a figure of some 
renown during the 1990s in Australia’s hacker community (Assange, 2011). As a 
hacker Assange is fully aware that information can be employed as a weapon and in 
1996 he pleaded guilty to 24 counts of hacking against high security organizations 
including NASA, the Pentagon, and Lockheed Martin amongst others (Leigh and 
Harding, 2011). The WikiLeaks network has itself been accused of being engaged in 
two forms of information warfare: a) cyber-terrorism against the State, and b) ‘brand 
damaging activities’ against corporations.  
 
a) Cyber-terrorism against the State 
 
WikiLeaks has been denounced as a foreign terrorist organization in the popular me-
dia and by senior US politicians including Vice President Joe Biden and Homeland 
Security chairman Peter King (Beckett and Ball, 2012; Leigh and Harding, 2011). 
Other US politicians including Peter Hoekstra and Mike Hukabee have called for the 
execution of leakers, and the Attorney General Eric Holder has proposed that Julian 
Assange be investigated for treason under the Espionage Act (Brevini et al., 2013; 
Thorsen, et al., 2013). These accusations were supported by statements from military 
spokespersons, such as Admiral Mike Mullen, who in response to the leaking of the 
Afghan war logs claimed that Assange had ‘blood on his hands’ (CNN, 29.07.2010).  
 
  - 24 - 
Media commentators have explicitly described WikiLeaks as being engaged in infor-
mation warfare and cyber-terrorism. In a rather shrill article published in The Wash-
ington Post (7.10.2010) Marc Thiessen compared WikiLeaks with cyber-terrorism 
arguing that, “If WikiLeaks is treating this as a war in cyberspace, America should do 
the same”. The article continued by berating the Obama administration for its lack of 
action in launching a counter-attack against the website. One might find such com-
ments a trifle exaggerated, however, in a less restrained tone published in The Wash-
ington Times (2.12.2010) Jeffrey Kuhner titled his article “Assassinate Assange?” In 
this piece he claimed that Assange was engaged in cyber warfare against the United 
States and continues that, “He is a willful enabler of Islamic terrorism.” Former dis-
gruntled insiders like Daniel Domscheit-Berg and Klopp (2011: 131) have claimed 
that Assange has himself described WikiLeaks as being an ‘insurgent operation.’  
 
Geert Lovink (2010: 4) has explained this conflict in less incendiary terms arguing 
that, “What some see as ‘citizen journalism’ others calls ‘info war’.” Nick Davies, a 
Guardian journalist who worked closely with WikiLeaks over the release of the Af-
ghanistan war logs, described the US response to the WikiLeaks network directed 
against Assange and its other members as an information war against WikiLeaks 
(Leigh and Harding, 2011: 99). Seen in this light it can be argued that WikiLeaks has 
been the target of an information war rather than the perpetrator.  The transparency 
activist Micah Sifry describes this dynamic in more technological terms arguing that, 
“Infowar can mean only one thing: the conflict between the naturally open infor-
mation systems of the present and the closed ones of the past.” (Sifry, 2011: 41). 
These commentaries on the structural aspects of the WikiLeaks project are very much 
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in line with Tiziana Terranova’s (2004) account of network culture resembling a bat-
tlefield rather than a democratic forum for debate.  
 
The militarization of the Internet has been a recent topic of discussion for both mili-
tary analysts (Arquilla and Rondfelt, 1997; Coker, 2004; Rid, 2013) and social theo-
rists (Munro, 2010; Terranova, 2004; Virilio, 2000). Assange himself remarked that, 
‘there is now a militarization of cyberspace… We are all living under martial law as 
far as our communications are concerned…’ (Assange et al., 2012: 33). The relevant 
international laws that are supposed to govern conflicts in cyberspace are detailed in 
the Tallinn Manual (Schmitt, 2013), which has attracted attention within the hacker 
community for its justification of the use of lethal force by States against hackers who 
are deemed to be engaged in cyber warfare (The Guardian, 18.3.2013).  
 
One of the major difficulties identified in this advisory document is addressing extra-
territorial attacks that take place in cyberspace where the document begins with the 
assertion of the right for a State to ‘exercise control over cyber infrastructure and ac-
tivities within its sovereign territory’ (Schmitt, 2013: 15). However, following this 
assertion the manual proceeds by outlining a large number of difficulties that arise in 
the enforcement of this territorial right due to the ‘extra territorial’ nature of cyber 
warfare. The very next line in the manual remarks somewhat ambiguously that while 
the principle of territorial sovereignty must be upheld, ‘no State may claim sovereign-
ty over cyberspace per se’ (Schmitt, 2013: 16). There is no clearer statement about the 
deterritorializing aspects of cyber-conflict than the efforts of States to regulate con-
flicts that are enacted within this realm.  
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The difficulties in establishing State sovereignty within cyberspace proliferate with 
each new page of the manual, requiring a growing number of caveats and sub clauses 
to clarify how territorial integrity might be maintained under the special conditions of 
cyber warfare (Schmitt, 2013). Rule 2 of the manual explains that, ‘It may be difficult 
to determine jurisdiction within cyberspace because cloud or grid distributed systems 
can span national borders, as can the replication and dynamic relocations of data and 
processing… data can be located in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously… (and) the 
location of mobile devices can change during a computing session.’ (Schmitt, 2013: 
19). The manual attempts to address this thorny problem by appealing to the principle 
of ‘objective territorial jurisdiction,’ which permits States to prosecute criminal acts 
that were originated abroad but completed on their own territory. This implicitly rec-
ognizes that cyber operations are of a relatively deterritorialized nature, and concedes 
that drafting legislation to prevent such operations will often prove fruitless ‘because 
doing so would have no meaningful effect on the outcome of the operation’ (Schmitt, 
2013: 28). Similar frustrations over the capacity to contain the activities of WikiLeaks 
have also been expressed within the corporate community. 
 
b) Brand damaging activities against corporations  
 
Many of the corporations that came into conflict with the WikiLeaks network have 
explicitly described the situation in terms of an information war. This is clearly illus-
trated in leaked documents from the European Commission (2012), where various 
corporations explained to the Commission the potential damage that the WikiLeaks 
network could cause their corporate brands. Official documents from MasterCard and 
Visa have revealed that they have a quite extraordinary interpretation of how Wik-
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iLeaks’ activities could affect their business operations. In response to an investiga-
tion into this affair by the European Commission (2012), MasterCard wrote that any 
association with WikiLeaks, ‘will be damaging for the public perception of Master-
Card and consequently {risk} damage for MasterCard’s goodwill or of its Marks.’ 
(MasterCard, quoted in European Commission, 2012). The company cited the rele-
vant sections from their Rules of Conduct pertaining to both the ‘Integrity of Brand 
and Network’ and ‘Illegal or Brand-damaging Transactions’. This response letter also 
outlined the concern of MasterCard for cyber-attacks in retaliation to their actions 
against WikiLeaks in which they referred to ‘several conversations with the FBI, US 
Treasury and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) about the possibility of 
MasterCard becoming a target of … DDOS {Distributed Denial of Service} attacks.’ 
(MasterCard, quoted in European Commission, 2012). Visa Europe followed Master-
Card’s lead in wanting to ‘disassociate its brand from WikiLeaks’  (Visa, quoted in 
European Commission, 2012). Governments and corporations have been united in a 
shared concern for informational attacks against their brand image and have also been 
united in developing ‘defensive strategies’ (MasterCard, quoted in European Com-
mission, 2012) against such perceived attacks by WikiLeaks.  
 
Of great concern here is the close relationship that has been forged between these pri-
vate corporations and key organizations within the US national security establishment 
including the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (Benkler, 2011). This 
leaked correspondence (European Commission, 2012) reveals the way in which these 
corporations have become an informal arm of the national security state and have 
framed their branding activities in terms of cyber attack where their brands are the 
subject of ‘attacks’ and ‘damage’ and must be provided with ‘defensive strategies.’ 
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This correspondence suggests that these corporations understand the promulgation of 
their business very much in the terms of information warfare, where their leaders feel 
quite justified in taking preemptive action against organizations that are deemed to be 
a potential threat to their brands.  
 
The aggressive response by the corporate world against WikiLeaks has prompted 
some hacker groups, most notably Anonymous, to respond with retaliatory informa-
tional attacks in support of WikiLeaks. Under the monikers ‘Operation Payback’ and 
‘Operation Avenge Assange’ the Anonymous collective launched a series of cyber 
attacks against targets that they deemed were hostile to the WikiLeaks network. Using 
a distributed denial of service attack Anonymous was able to disable the main website 
of Mastercard for a few hours and inflicted modest financial harm (PayPal claimed 
$5.5m of damage). Their attacks against the websites of Amazon.com and Paypal 
were of insufficient scale to cause any significant disruption to these large corpora-
tions. A few prominent individuals were also targeted, such as the Republican politi-
cian Sarah Palin, who had her credit card account temporarily disrupted. This was a 
truly deterritorialized attack, involving 7,800 members of Anonymous, geographically 
dispersed and unknown to each other beyond their online pseudonyms, in addition to 
the remote use of many thousand more terminals by means of botnets (Coleman, 
2014). The broader significance of these different informational skirmishes is a matter 
of some contention. John Barlow, the founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
described the event as being the ‘first serious information war’ (quoted in Beckett and 
Ball, 2012: 65). In contrast, the legal scholar Alasdair Roberts (2012: 121) has argued 
that the counter attack by Anonymous against Amazon and MasterCard did little to 
disrupt their business and that, “The ‘first serious info war’ was over, with negligible 
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damage to the targeted institutions.” Notwithstanding the academic debate over the 
significance of these informational attacks, the FBI has subsequently arrested and 
charged 16 people for cyber-crimes related to Operation Payback (The Guardian, 
23.11.2012).  
 
In summary, the scope of the information warfare in the WikiLeaks case is broad, in-
cluding accusations of cyber-terrorism against the State and brand damaging activities 
against corporations. This information war has evolved over a series of attacks and 
counter-attacks including: i) WikiLeaks release of sensitive corporate, diplomatic and 
military secrets onto the Internet, ii) defensive tactics by WikiLeaks locating the web-
site in countries that have favourable freedom of information laws and ‘mirroring’ it 
at hundreds of other locations throughout the Internet, iii) attempts by the State to dis-
credit WikiLeaks and to prosecute its members and allies, especially Assange himself, 
iv) attempts by US corporations to disrupt the communication networks and financial 
networks upon which WikiLeaks is reliant, v) hacker attacks targeting WikiLeaks to 
disable its website, and vi) cyber attacks targeting corporations by hacktivist groups 
such as Anonymous that are sympathetic to WikiLeaks’ aims. This information war 
demonstrates that the State has clearly struggled to contain the deterritorializing tac-
tics of WikiLeaks (points i and ii) and those of its allies (point vi). In retaliation, the 
State and business corporations have employed reterritorializing tactics (points iii and 
iv), and have also promoted their own informational attacks against the site (point v). 
These vectors of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are indicative of a trans-
formation of information systems into weapon systems. As Deleuze and Guattari 
(1988:204) themselves explained, ‘It is on lines of flight {deterritorialization} that 
new weapons are invented, to be turned against the heavy arms of the State.’  
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Now that I have outlined the different vectors of deterritorialization and reterritoriali-
zation that have characterized the evolution of WikiLeaks as a network organization, I 
shall turn to an evaluation of the broader implications of this analysis for understand-
ing current transformations in the network organization. 
 
Discussion: Redefining Resistance as Vectors of Deterritorialization 
 
The WikiLeaks network can be understood as a rapidly changing ‘rhizomic’ network 
(Chia, 1999; Linstead and Thanem, 2007) whose emergence has had significant im-
plications for organizational power relations. This inquiry has described the destabili-
zation of power relations through vectors of deterritorialization where the ‘power cen-
ters are defined much more by what escapes them or by their impotence than by their 
zone of power’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 217). The paper shows that WikiLeaks’ 
efforts to create a deterritorialized ‘space of autonomy’ (Castells, 2012) has prompted 
aggressive counter-measures from central nodes of influence in an effort to re-assert 
their control over informational flows and resources. As such this paper would not go 
as far as Castells’ (2012: 2) utopian assertion that ‘Internet social networks… are 
spaces of autonomy, largely beyond the control of government and corporations’, but 
instead has highlighted the contested nature of these spaces and the tactics of re-
sistance that can be employed to destabilize existing forms of control in the attempt to 
create new spaces of autonomy.  
 
It is true that WikiLeaks has met with only limited success where many of its opera-
tions have now been blocked as a result of internal conflicts within the organization 
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(Beckett and Ball, 2012; Domscheit-Berg and Klopp, 2011) and the financial block-
ade that has been levelled against it by corporate interests. Nevertheless, the Wik-
iLeaks’ model has spawned a significant number of imitators online (see Greenberg, 
2012 and http://leakdirectory.org/index.php) as well as in the traditional media. It has 
also been highly influential in the work of social movements (Amnesty International, 
2011; Sifry, 2011) and in the establishment of Iceland’s new constitution and its aim 
to become a national anti-secrecy haven (IMMI.org). Many of these imitators have 
focused on the issues of particular countries, such as TuniLeaks, RuLeaks, Balkan-
Leaks, IsraeliLeaks, and VatiLeaks. Others are more narrowly confined to special in-
terests such as Copyleaks, devoted to academic plagiarism, GreenLeaks, devoted to 
environmental issues, and TradeLeaks which is devoted to consumer activism. Large 
media corporations have also created their own leaking websites including the Wall 
Street Journal Safehouse and the Al Jazeera Transparency Unit. 
 
In contrast to the original WikiLeaks website, its imitators tend to offer little protec-
tion for whistleblowers. A major flaw that has been identified in these imitators is that 
they do not offer full anonymity to their whistleblowers as did WikiLeaks, and the 
newspapers mentioned above explicitly reserve the right to pass on whistleblower de-
tails to State authorities (Greenberg, 2012). It would thus appear that although the 
WikiLeaks’ model has been hugely influential across a range of social domains, it has 
been increasingly watered down as it has been imitated by others. There are a few im-
portant exceptions to this general observation, including a minority of leaking sites 
that employ strict technological protection to ensure anonymity (e.g. TOR software), 
and the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI.org), which has developed strong 
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legal protection for whistleblowers and the media outlets that publish their revela-
tions.  
 
The mutation in relations of power and resistance represented by WikiLeaks can be 
understood as exhibiting both a liberal reformist aspect and a more radical insurgent 
aspect. The liberal reformist aspect of WikiLeaks is apparent in its own rhetoric 
where it describes its mission in terms of facilitating good corporate governance 
through increased transparency: ‘Open government answers injustice rather than caus-
ing it. Open government exposes and undoes corruption. Open governance is the most 
effective method of promoting good governance’ (https://wikileaks.org/About.html, 
see also Fuchs, 2011). This rhetoric presents the WikiLeaks network as an extension 
of the Fourth Estate and a part of the free press that serves as a crucial democratic 
check on State power (Benkler, 2011; Sifry, 2011). In contrast to this reformist rheto-
ric the more radical tendencies of the WikiLeaks network have become apparent from 
its deterritorializing processes, which have been characterized as being a threat to 
corporate power and to national security (Brevini et al., 2013; Centre for Constitu-




WikiLeaks can be understood as a form of ‘resistance to the present’ that pursues an 
‘absolute deterritorialization’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 99-108)v. This absolute 
deterritorialization moves well beyond its initial status as a whistleblowing platform 
to its more ambitious initiatives in the creation of anti-secrecy havens that support 
privacy for the weak and transparency of the powerful. In contrast to existing research 
within the field of organization studies (Ball, 2005; Bain and Taylor, 2000; Burrell, 
1988; Clegg, and Baumeier, 2010; Munro, 2000), which has provided a detailed anal-
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ysis of how communication networks have intensified organizational surveillance this 
paper has shown how a network organization can invert the existing hegemonic sys-
tems of surveillance. The tactics of resistance that have been examined in the above 
analysis follow vectors of deterritorialization which escape the control of other organ-
izations and vectors of reterritorialization that attempt to re-exert control. The present 
inquiry has shown how WikiLeaks exploits vectors of deterritorialization to destabi-
lize existing power relations and has thus been able to exert influence from the pe-




Table 1. Vectors of Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization 
Vectors of Deterritorialization Vectors of Reterritorialization 
WikiLeaks’ multi-jurisdictional exploita-
tion of censorship laws 
State/Corporate para-regulatory control of 
the Internet 
Mirror websites to decentralize and deter-
ritorialize WikiLeaks 
Financial blockade of WikiLeaks by ma-
jor corporations 
Corporate/State secrecy havens (e.g. Off-
shore banking, Guantanamo Bay) 
Anti-secrecy/transparency havens (e.g. 
Iceland’s IMMI and WikiLeaks itself) 
Legal and technological protection of pri-
vacy 
Law suits and grand jury proceedings 
against WikiLeaks  
Cypherpunk information movement The body of Assange under house arrest 
and subsequent political asylum 
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Cyber warfare operations targeting Wik-
iLeaks as well as corporations (e.g. Op-
eration Payback against Paypal, Master-
Card and Amazon)  
‘Objective territorial jurisdiction’ of na-





Table 1 reveals a complex interaction between the tactics of resistance of WikiLeaks 
and its diverse vectors of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. There is a signif-
icant isomorphism between WikiLeaks’ tactics of resistance and its vectors of deterri-
torialization, and conversely between tactics of power and the attempts to reterritorial-
ize its operations. Despite considerable isomorphism between the vectors of deterrito-
rialization and tactics of resistance, there are important instances where this is not the 
case. There are two vectors of deterritorialization that are not employed by WikiLeaks 
but by corporations and the State. These include the offshore activities of corporations 
to avoid democratic oversight, as well as the State’s ventures into cyberspace and its 
employment of information warfare. There is also a single case where WikiLeaks it-
self has resorted to an important reterritorializing tactic, using transparency as a tool 
to bring the activities of corporations and agents of the State (e.g. the military) under 
greater democratic oversight.  
 
In summary, whilst there is a considerable overlap between resistance and deterritori-
alization, and power and reterritorialization, this cannot be taken for granted. This 
analysis is in keeping with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) own analysis of power 
where they note that whilst nomadism creates a line of escape that approaches an ‘ab-
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solute deterritorialization’, capitalism is also a deterritorializing force, but one that 




WikiLeaks is an ‘alternative organization’ (Parker et al., 2014) that has built up a 
network of resistance to corporate and State power from the periphery of existing 
networks (Böhm, et al, 2008; Davis et al, 2005; Kraemer, et al., 2013; Spicer and 
Böhm, 2007; Spicer and Van Bommel, 2011). In contrast to existing studies of power 
which have tended to focus on the intensification of workplace surveillance (Ball, 
2005; Bain and Taylor, 2000; Burrell, 1988; Clegg, and Baumeier, 2010; Munro, 
2000) and micropolitical acts of resistance within the workplace (Alvesson and Will-
mott, 1992; Bain and Taylor, 2000; Ball and Wilson, 2000; Contu, 2008; Courpasson 
et al., 2012; Fleming and Spicer, 2003; Jermier, et al, 1994; Knights and McCabe 
2000, 2003), the present paper has looked beyond the boundaries of the workplace for 
sources of resistance. This paper provides a conceptual contribution to the literature 
on the network organization (Brass et al., 2004; Castells, 2012, 2013; Clegg, and 
Baumeier, 2010; Lash, 2002; Munro, 2000; Terranova, 2004) by identifying the di-
verse vectors of deterritorialization that have allowed WikiLeaks to act from the pe-
riphery of existing networks in its attempt to destabilize power and build a counter-
hegemonic system of surveillance. 
 
This inquiry is in partial agreement with Castells’ (2013: xxv) own analysis of the 
WikiLeaks network regarding its democratic potential to create ‘new opportunities for 
citizen control over their representatives.’ However, the focus of the present investi-
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gation has been on the identification of the distinctive tactics that have enabled Wik-
iLeaks to exert power from the periphery and how these tactics have exploited partic-
ular vectors of deterritorialization. The paper makes three contributions to the under-
standing of power in organizations: i) it shows how power can be exercised by organ-
izations on the periphery of existing networks rather than as a function of central 
nodes, ii) it explains the destabilization of existing power relations in terms of the 
concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, iii) and it shows how tactics of 
resistance are effective to the extent that they approach an ‘absolute deterritorializa-
tion’. This paper demonstrates how WikiLeaks has  amplified micropolitical acts of 
workplace resistance (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Contu, 2008; Courpasson et al., 
2012; Fleming and Spicer, 2003; Jermier, et al, 1994; Knights and McCabe 2000) to 
engage in a broader counter-hegemonic attack upon the secrecy havens of the power-
ful. 
 
This paper opens up new avenues for research in organization studies with respect to 
a number of important issues. Further research is needed into processes of deterritori-
alization of the development of new forms of network organization. What are the 
more general implications of the increasingly deterritorialized aspects of networks for 
organizational innovation and organizational politics? The role of secrecy havens is in 
need of further empirical research (see Sikka 2003 for an excellent step in this direc-
tion). In particular, there is a clear need for further investigation of the interface be-
tween the State and corporations, especially with respect to the possible existence of 
an ‘extra judicial’ regulatory system. 
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i
 The founder of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, was voted the Reader’s Choice for Time 
Magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 2010, where Facebook’s founder, Mark Zucker-
berg, was the official Man of the Year. 
ii
 This general definition does not capture the importance of processes of deterritorial-
ization to Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the rhizome and the process of be-
coming. They define the rhizome and becoming in terms of different vectors of deter-
ritorialization, where their classic exemplar is the wasp/orchid rhizome. They explain 
how a line of deterritorialization passes between the wasp and the orchid, where the 
wasp is ‘deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive apparatus’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988:9). In the present paper, the first section of the analysis 
of WikiLeaks investigates the rhizomatic alliances and mutations of this network, and 
the later sections attend to the more geographical and political nature of its deterritori-
alizations.    
iii
 The NSA whistleblower, Edward Snowden, was in a far more precarious situation, 
where he was truly stateless having had his US passport revoked and then forced to 
confine himself to the relatively deterritorialized space of Moscow airport, being una-
ble to leave this space without fear of arrest and rendition. 
iv
 The coexistence of reformist and radical aspects in the WikiLeaks network has led 
to radically different interpretations of this organization where some focus on the pro-
ject’s libertarian rhetoric (see Fuchs, 2011) and others on its status as an insurgent 
project (see Zizek in Assange et al., 2013). 
v
 Deleuze and Guattari explain this process of ‘absolute deterrritorialization’ in terms 
of radical resistance that is able to overcome further reterritorialization by the State or 
capital by creating ‘utopias of immanence’ and a ‘new earth’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1988: 510; 1994: 99-113). 
vi
 Note, this summary table is inclusive of those vectors analyzed in the sections on 
information warfare and the previous sections on secrecy and anti-secrecy havens and 
the structure of WikiLeaks.   
